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Insurance—Covenant Not to Sue Defendant-Insured and Primary In-
surer—Right of Action Against Defendant as Insured of Excess
Insurer.—Deblon v. Beaton.'—Plaintiff Deblon instituted a negligence
action for damages against Foley, the owner of a motor vehicle in which
plaintiff's decedent was a passenger, and against Beaton, the driver. Beaton's
operation of the vehicle with Foley's permission was covered under the
standard "omnibus" clause"- of Foley's liability insurance policy. This policy,
issued by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) had a $50,000 limit for this
accident, and was the "primary" policy. 3 Beaton also was covered under his
own policy written by the Jersey insurance Company of New York of the
Pacific of New York Group (Jersey). The Jersey policy included the standard
"other insurance" clause which provides that if an accident is covered by an-
other policy, the $10,000 limit of the policy is to be regarded as "excess" in-
surance and available only if a judgment in excess of the limits of the other
policy is obtained.
Before the trial of the negligence action, plaintiff executed a "covenant
not to sue." The instrument recited consideration of $46,500 and released
Foley and Beaton to the extent of their personal assets and their Allstate
coverage, but reserved plaintiff's rights against Jersey and against Beaton in
his capacity as insured of Jersey. The $46,500 consideration was paid entirely
by Allstate. Thereafter, plaintiff sought construction of the covenant as pre-
serving her rights against Beaton as insured of Jersey. Jersey was made a
party by the court for purposes of construing the instrument, and it moved
for dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim.
The issue raised by the motion was whether the covenant, by releasing
the personal assets of defendant Beaton, precluded further recovery against his
excess insurer, Jersey. In support of the motion to dismiss, Jersey argued,
first, that the covenant expressly released Beaton, and thereby precluded an
effective reservation of rights against Jersey; and, second, that even if the
instrument were construed according to the parties' intent to release all rights
except those against Beaton as insured of Jersey, it could not be given legal
effect.4
The court rejected both of Jersey's contentions and HELD: A plaintiff
may divide defendant tortfeasor into three separate and distinct entities,
individual, insured of the primary insurer, and insured of the excess insurer,
and may release for consideration the individual and the primary insurer while
retaining the right of action against the individual as insured of the excess
insurer." Thus, plaintiff was permitted to release Foley, Beaton and Allstate
but to sue Beaton as insured of Jersey.
1 103 N.J. Super. 345, 247 A.2d 172 (L. Div. 1968).
2 This clause defines "insured" for purposes of coverage to include, for example,
members of the named insured's household, and other persons using the vehicle with
permission of the named insured.
3 A policy is designated "primary" when there is other insurance covering the same
liability and the other policy validly provides, for example, that with respect to temporary
substitute motor vehicles, or insured's use of motor vehicles other than his own, the
other policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance.
4 103 N.J. Super. at 349-50, 247 A.2d at 174-75.
5 Id.
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Jersey's first argument—that release of defendant's personal assets auto-
matically released Jersey—was based on the common law rules for the con-
struction of releases and covenants not to sue. A release extinguishes the cause
of action; however, a covenant not to sue has no effect on the cause of action
itself, but terminates plaintiff's right to sue the potential defendants who are
parties to the instrument.° Although the instrument may recite that it is a
covenant or a release, the circumstances attending its execution determine
whether it will operate as a covenant or a release? The common law recog-
nizes a distinction between covenants and releases based upon the relationship
between the party with whom plaintiff executes the instrument (who shall
be called A) and the party whom plaintiff then attempts to pursue (B). Where
A and B are true joint tortfeasors—both having contributed to plaintiff's in-
jury by independent negligent acts—a rule of construction favors the
plaintiff. Thus, the agreement not to sue A need not expressly reserve plaintiff's
rights against B since the intent of plaintiff, express or implied, to pursue B is
permitted to controls Therefore, the instrument operates as a covenant not to
sue A and does not terminate plaintiff's right to sue B. However, where the
instrument or circumstances indicate that A has made full satisfaction of
plaintiff's claims, an intent to release B will be implied and given effect," for
it is a well established rule that the plaintiff may receive but one satisfaction.'"
Where the liability of B is merely vicarious—that is, that of a master or
principal (B) for the torts of his servant or agent (A)—a rule of law rather
than a rule of construction governs. The rule is that any instrument releasing
A will automatically absolve B regardless of plaintiff's attempt to reserve ex-
pressly his rights against the party secondarily liable?' Because B's liability
arises merely by operation of law, an attempt to execute a covenant not to sue
A will operate as a release of B, since there would no longer be any liability
which can be imputed to B. Some jurisdictions have abrogated this common
law rule and permit construction of the instrument even where B's liability is
only derivative?" Thus, release of A with an express reservation of rights
against B would be permitted to operate as a covenant not to sue A.
6 See Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 14 III. App. 2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717 (1957).
7 See Bacon v. United States, 321 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1963).
8 76 C.J.S. Release § 50(a) (2) (1952). See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
9 See Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 363-64, 146 A.2d 665, 671-72 (1958).
19 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1960).
11 Simpson v. Townsley, 283 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Seaboard Air Line A.R.
v. Coastal Distrib. Co., 273 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (D.S.C. 1967); Holcomb v. Flavin, 34
III.2d 558, 563-64, 216 N.E.2d 811, 815 (1966) ; Bergeron v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 137
So. 2d 63 (La. Ct. App. 1962) ; Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845, 848-50 (Okla. 1959).
The rule that a covenant not to sue the servant automatically absolves the master
also appears to be followed in New Jersey, Rossum v. Jones, 97 N.J. Super. 382, 389,
235 A.2d 206, 210 (App. Div. 1967), except where plaintiff, at the time when he released
the servant, was unaware that he was employed. See Hamburger v. Paterson Tallow Co.,
122 N.J.L. 457, 5 A.2d 487 (Sup. ,Ct. 1939). The rule announced in Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J.
351, 364, 146 A.2d 665, 672 (1958), that "release of one joint tortfeasor does not neces-
sarily release others" appears to have been applied only to true joint tortfeasors.
12 See United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1953), con-
struing the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1964) ; Ellis v. Jewett Rhodes
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The foregoing discussion indicates that precedent does exist for the con-
struction of an instrument as a covenant not to sue in order to preserve
rights against joint tortfeasors or vicarious obligors.' 3 However, the liability of
an insurer is distinguishable from both, and logically should be immune from
the application of any intent test. Unlike a joint tortfeasor, the insurer com-
mits no independent act of negligence, and unlike a vicarious obligor, the
insurer, in the absence of a direct action statute, may not be pursued in the
first instance by the injured party. The insurer's obligation is purely con-
tractual and contingent—"to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages." 14 The obligation
of the insurer seems more analogous to that of the guarantor of a debt. 15 It is
well settled that the creditor's release of the principal obligor operates as a
matter of law as a release of the guarantor's contractual liability.'" However,
the Deblon court applied a rule of construction by which the intent of plain-
tiff to create a covenant rather than a release controlled so that plaintiff was
permitted to release Beaton from personal liability without releasing his li-
ability as insured of Jersey. This treatment of the insured-insurer relationship
fails without adequate justification to conform to the common law rules.
The court's finding that Jersey was not automatically released by the
covenant was only preliminary to the second and more important question:
whether plaintiff's intention to split the defendant's liability can be given
legal effect" Jersey quite logically argued that, under the insurance contract,
its obligation to pay matured only after the insured became legally obligated
to pay, that is, after a trial and judgment against the insured.'s Thus, the
release of Beaton's personal assets released his entire liability so that Beaton
could not be sued, and Jersey's duty to pay could never mature. Again, the
situation might be compared to that of a debtor and surety. It would be im-
Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 84 P.2d 791 (1938); Wilson v. New York, 131 N.Y.S.2d
47 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
13 But see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
11 103 N.J. Super. at 350, 247 A.2d at 175.
13 Jersey's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion at 2.
16 See S. Williston and G. Thompson, Williston on Contracts § 339 (student ed.
1938).
11 It should be noted that Jersey did not raise the argument that, because the con-
sideration paid was $46,500 rather than the full $50,000 limit of the Allstate policy, its
liability could never become effective because the limits of the primary policy were not
exhausted. It has been held that there is no requirement that the limits of the primary
policy be exhausted, only that the defendant receive credit for that amount. Benroth
v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270, 276 (W.D.La. 1955). Where the instrument
recited the limits of the policy as consideration, though the amount actually paid left a
margin comparable to that in Deblon, it was deemed sufficient to ignite the liability of
the excess insurer. Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 136 So. 2d 724, 730 (La. Ct. App.
1961), aff'd, 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964). The result would probably not
vary on the facts of Deblon, for it is implicit in the instrument that the full liability
of Allstate is released. Moreover, should the judgment be less than $60,000, Jersey would
be liable only for that amount which exceeds $50,000.
18 The court agreed that "a jury verdict of negligence and damages in excess of the
primary coverage" is required, 103 N.J. Super. at 351, 247 A.2d at 175, but it would
permit the verdict to be reached in a suit against a partial defendant, Beaton, as insured
of the excess insurer.
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proper to permit the creditor to release the debtor's personal assets and to
sue him only as he is secured by the guarantor. Rather, the ability of the cred-
itor to pay should be exhausted before the guarantor's liability ripens. The
insurer's liability differs from the surety's only with respect to the time at
which it takes effect. The liability of the insurer arises not when the insured's
assets are exhausted, but when a liability which would otherwise be executed
against those assets is established. In either case, once the liability of the in-
sured or debtor to pay from his personal assets is extinguished, the condition
precedent to the insurer's or surety's liability could never be fulfilled." The
Deblon court appears to view the insurance policy as an unconditional asset
of the insured rather than a contingent asset. 2°
The court sustains the covenant's intended effect to split the defendant
into more than one suable entity on three grounds. First, the insurance con-
tract was one of liability rather than indemnity. 2 ' Second, precedent was sup-
plied by decisions in two other jurisdictions which did not turn on the respec-
tive direct action and partial release statutes in force in those states. 22 Third,
a strong public policy in New Jersey favored the availability of liability in-
surance to injured parties. 23
The difference between liability and indemnity insurance lies in the con-
ditions precedent to the accrual of the insurer's obligation to pay. 24 No action
may be brought on a contract of indemnity until after the insured has dis-
charged the liability. 25 Then the insured may seek reimbursement for his loss
actually sustained. However, a liability insurer takes the place of the in-
sured and pays in his stead a judgment entered against the insured. 26 Al-
though Beaton is not required to pay from his personal assets before pursuing
Jersey, the court's use of this distinction is not so persuasive as to satisfy the
condition that' there be a judgment against Beaton which attaches to his per-
sonal assets. Unless the insurer's obligation is considered an absolute asset, it
seems technically impossible under the terms of the covenant to fulfill the
condition precedent to Jersey's liability.
Second, the court relied on two recent cases which on facts indistin-
guishable from Deblon reached the same conclusion. The first, Futch v.
19 In Defendant's Motion for Leave to Appeal at 7, it was emphasized that it
would be technically impossible to enter a judgment according to the intention of the
covenant. Under New Jersey law, any judgment in excess of 850,000 would create an
automatic lien against Beaton's real property in New Jersey until the liability of Jersey
could be established. Id. at 7.
25 Cf. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966),
which characterized the obligation of an insurer as a debt subject to attachment, and
rejected the argument that it is merely a contingent obligation. Criticized in 8 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 147 (1966).
21 103 N.J. Super. at 350, 247 A.2d at 175.
22 Id.
22 Id. at 351, 247 A.2d at 175.
24 Id. at 350, 247 A.2d, at 175.
25 8 J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4831 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Appleman]. See Viddish v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 41 N.J. Super. 221, 225, 124
Aid 607, 608-09 (App. Div. 1956).
20 Appleman § 4831.
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Fidelity & Cas. Co.,27 arose in Louisiana. Louisiana has a direct action
statute permitting a cause of action for negligence to be brought against
the insurer in the first instance. 28 The statute has been held not to create
an independent substantive cause of action, but to permit the plaintiff
to enforce his fundamental cause of action against the insurer. 22 This new
remedy is most beneficial for plaintiffs when the person of the defendant is
not subject to service of process, since under the statute he is not a necessary
or indispensable party. When the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction, the
plaintiff is given the choice of pursuing either the tortfeasor or his insurer.
However, under the direct action statute the contractual obligation of the
insurer remains the same, that is, to pay only when the insured is liable. And
if the substantive cause of action against the insured is extinguished by an
instrument of release prior to trial, the procedural right of direct action
against the insurer falls also by operation of law." Thus, the statute does not
encompass the issue whether the release of the insured's personal asset extin-
guishes the cause of action against the insured which is the necessary foun-
dation for the insurer's liability.
Futch held that release of the primary insurer and the defendant to the
extent of his personal assets with reservation of rights against the excess in-
surer did not operate as a release of the excess insurer. The Louisiana court
relied in part on the case of Benrotk v. Continental Cas. Co.,8 ' in which the
primary insurer alone was released, with retention of rights against both the
tortfeasor and the excess insurer. Thus, Benroth did not clearly raise the
issue presented in Futch and Deblon because the person of the defendant
was by the terms of the instrument still liable and available as a foundation for
the direct action against the excess insurer. Futch also supported its holding
with a principle of public policy, that "an insurance policy against liability
is not issued primarily for the protection of the insured but for the protection
of the public."32 Only to the extent that this policy was clearly articulated by
the direct action statute was that legislation essential to the holding. There-
fore, only if equal weight can be given to New Jersey's judicially promul-
gated policies and Louisiana's legislated policy is Futch sound precedent for
the Deblon holding.
The second case relied upon by Deblon arose under the Missouri partial
release statute. 33 The Deblon court stated that Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Drane," like Futch, did not turn on the particular statute involved. How-
ever, the Missouri statute as construed by its own court was necessary for the
decision; therefore, Diane is not sound authority for judicial enforcement of
defendant-splitting. The statute provided:
27 136 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. '1961), aff'd, 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964).
28 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (1959).
20 Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 1118, 134 So. 2d 45,
52 (1961) (on rehearing).
39 Id. at 1118, 134 So. 2d at 52.
37 '132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955).
32 136 So. 2d at 728-29, citing Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 La. 459,
476-77, 6 So. 2d 351, 357 (1942).
33 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.065 (Pocket Supp. 1968).
34 383 S.W.2d 714 (1964).
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Any person having an unliquidated claim for damages against a
tortfeasor, on account of bodily injuries or death, may enter into a
contract with such tortfeasor or any insurer in his behalf or both,
whereby, . . . [the plaintiff] agrees . . . [that] he ... will [not]
levy execution . . . except against the specific assets listed in the
contract and except against any insurer .. . which is not excepted
... by such contract.35
The insurer contended that release of the original tortfeasor's assets for con-
sideration raised a bar to litigation between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor,
which bar could not be avoided by any statute. The court replied that the
effect of the statute on preexisting legal theories was similar to the effect of a
statute which changed the rule that a settlement with one joint tortfeasor
constituted a settlement for all tortfeasors." Thus, the court recognized that
the statute ostensibly authorized the plaintiff to enter into a contract not to
execute against certain assets of defendant, but in effect preserved the liability
of the defendant for purposes of reaching his insurer. The court declined to
comment on whether the instrument would have operated as a release of the
insurer in the absence of the statute, but the fact that the statute was specif-
ically enacted for the Drane action during its pendency 37 strongly suggests
that the insurer would have been released by the instrument in the absence of
statute.
Because both the indemnity-liability distinction and the cases cited by
Deblon are inherently weak as authority, the essence of the Dcblon decision
is clearly public policy. Indeed, Futch, the only applicable precedent, was
based on policy as well. The Deblon court cited three "jurisprudential guide-
posts" of New Jersey law to support its conclusion as being in the "public
interest." These guideposts indicate a judicial trend toward a policy of ex-
pediting full compensation for plaintiff's by (1) making the defendant's
liability insurance more available to injured plaintiffs," (2) acknowledging
that the injured party acquires an interest in the insurance policy at the time
of the accident,3° and (3) construing the insurance policy to afford the widest
possible coverage."
By characterizing the insurance policy as an absolute rather than a con-
tingent asset of the defendant, Deblon permits the defendant's liability to be
perpetuated by a mitotic process. This characterization is not defensible ex-
cept as it furthers other public policies having a firmer foundation in logic.
First, in instances where there are two liability insurers, the Deblon rule
encourages the plaintiff to settle with one insurer since recovery from the
second insurer will not be precluded, and offers the defendant incentive to
agree by protecting his personal assets. Deblon also promotes the policy of
35 Mo. Ann. Stat § 537.065 (Pocket Supp. 1968).
36 383 S.W.2d at 719.
37 Id. at 718.
38 Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 306, 321, 237 A.2d 289, 296 (1967).
36 In re Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. Super. 261, 265, 191 A.2d 294, 296 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
40 American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Portale, 88 N.J. Super. 429, 439, 212 A.2d
668, 674 (1965).
1035
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
making the insurer's deep pockets more accessible. The social importance of
directing the financial burden away from impecunious defendants and ulti-
mately away from the state cannot be gainsaid. Thus, liability insurance is
regarded as an instrument of social policy" rather than as a private—albeit
adhesion—contract between the insurer and insured, and judicial decisions,
such as Deblon, which assail the contractual position of the insurer become
easier to accept.
The effect of Deblon on the insurance contract is to controvert the lan-
guage of the "no action" clause which provides that the company cannot be
sued unless the amount of the insured's obligation has been finally determined
by judgment against the insured after actual trial. The purpose of the clause
is to avoid jury prejudice by withholding the fact of defendant's insurance
from the jury. This prohibition is aimed at joinder and impleader 42 of the
insurer, and direct action against the company. Although the court, in effect,
permits the plaintiff to proceed only against the excess carrier, it may be
assumed that the fiction of defendant-splitting will preserve the benefits of
secrecy which are the purpose of the "no action" clause. Presumably, the
named defendant in the negligence action will be "Beaton" rather than "Beat-
on as insured of Jersey" and the jury need not be made aware of (I) the
fact that Jersey is involved, (2) the limits of coverage, or (3) Allstate's set-
tlement. Nor does Deblon change the position of Jersey in the courtroom, for
the insurer's obligation to defend would have required it to provide counsel
and preparation for the whole defendant, had not two-thirds of him been
released.43
 Thus, Deblon achieves the effect of direct action against the in-
surer without violating the purpose of the "no action" clause.
The effect of Deblon, however, is distinguishable from direct action and
joinder, other methods for circumventing or negating "no action" provisions
in the insurance contract. Direct action statutes permit action against the
insurer alone before a judgment is entered against the insured.4' The public
character of insurance is deemed sufficient to confer on the states the broad
power to impose such regulations.45
 The Deblon result seems analogous to di-
rect action because both characterize the insurer as more than a contingent
41 Appleman § 4861.
42 The standard "No Action" clause was clarified in 1958 ... to provide that,
not only shall the Co. [insurance company] not be sued as a party along with
the insured, but also [that] the Co. may not be impleaded by the insured or his
legal representative. Thus under the latest revision [of the no action clause], the
insured must wait in order to sue the Co. until a judgment has been entered
against the insured after an "actual trial".
Gowan, Provisions of Automobile and Liability Insurance Contracts, 30 Ins. Coun. J. 96,
106 (1963) (footnote omitted).
43 A clause of the insurance contract usually invests the company with the right and
duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages payable under the terms
of the policy, to investigate the accident, and to pay in addition to the applicable limits
of liability all expenses and costs incurred by the company in defending the suit.
44 See Appleman § 4863.
45 See Comment, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law
Problems, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 359 (1960). But see Kuntz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1934).
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asset of the injured. However, Deblon does not give the plaintiff the substantial
benefit of direct action—that defendant insured is not an indispensable party
—since in Deblon jurisdiction over the insured must be secured.
Judicial sanction of joinder has been permitted on two bases. First, where
insurance is required of common carriers by statute or ordinance, some courts
decline to enforce the "no action" clause, both because the jury would already
be aware that an insurer is involved," and because the statute or ordinance is
construed to confer a benefit on the injured party.47 Second, some jurisdic-
tions have rules of civil procedure providing that "any person may be made
a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff," 48 and
those courts consider the insurer such a real party in interest as to fall within
this definition of defendant."
The New Jersey courts have not yet permitted joinder of the insurer in a
negligence action. Because New Jersey has no compulsory insurance law for
all motor vehicles, its courts would be unable to permit joinder on the ground
that no reason for secrecy exists. Nor does New Jersey have a rule of pro-
cedure like the rule mentioned above. The Deblon rule is distinct from joinder
in that under the former the insurer is technically not a separate suable en-
tity, but an asset of the defendant which may be sued through the defendant
rather than with him." Moreover, even where joinder is permitted, a covenant
prior to trial releasing the personal assets of the defendant tortfeasor might be
construed to release the insurer. Both Deblon and joinder effectuate the policy
of diminishing piecemeal litigation—the former by encouraging partial settle-
ment before trial and thereby eliminating the need for an action to determine
the liability of the primary insurer, and the latter by resolving the issue of
insurer's liability as part of the negligence action.
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute or contractual provision,
the plaintiff has no right against the tortfeasor's insurer. 51 By permitting the
plaintiff to split the defendant into separate and distinct entities—individual,
insured of the primary insurer, and insured of the excess insurer—and to
release two of these entities for consideration but to retain a right of action
against the individual as insured of the excess insurer, Deblon has eroded this
rule. The policies promotive of at least partial settlement and the establish-
ment of liability insurance as an instrument protecting injured complainants
are so strong that any adverse effect of the decision on the "no action" clause
of the insurance policy is justified. However, unlike direct action or joinder,
the decision does not prevent the achievement of a purpose of the "no action"
clause, prevention of jury prejudice through concealment of the fact that
4° Appleman § 4862.
47 Id. See Enders v. Longmire, 179 Okla. 633, 67 P.2d 12 (1937).
48 E.g., Ha. Stat. Ann., Rules of Civil Proc., R. 1.210(a) (1967).
Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1968) ; See James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451
43 N.W.2d 692 (1950).
5° Perhaps Deblon may be compared more accurately to a right of limited ap-
pearance by which the defendant's liability in the negligence action is limited to the
value of stipulated assets. See Developments in the Law—State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 909, 953 (1960).
51 See Chamberlin v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 2d 330, 206 P.2d 661 (1949).
1037
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
defendant is insured. Nor does Deblon make the insurer a separate suable
entity as does direct action and joinder, although it approaches that result by
characterizing the insurer as something more than a contingent asset of the
insured.
JUDITH E. CIANI
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